evidence gathered in the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (tstd) on vessels' owners, state-sponsored companies' participation in the transatlantic slave trade was quite modest, accounting only for 6 percent of overall commerce in the period between 1514 and 1866. A comparative analysis of the number of voyages organised by state-sponsored companies sailing under different flags also points to identical results, representing less than 10 percent of the total share for each flag.
The sole exception is the Netherlands for which the number of voyages organized by the wic and the Middleburg Commercial Company (mcc) accounted for around 35 percent of the slave voyages carried out under the Dutch flag.3 It is likely, however, that the participation of state-sponsored companies in the Dutch slave trade is over-represented, as recent scholarship in this field has shown that it was common practise for these companies, especially the first and second wic, to rely on the services of private merchants and entrepreneurs to conduct many of their inter-continental commercial and shipping activities. In this study we aim, therefore, to give private participation in the slave trade the attention it deserves, given its weight in the overall volume of trade as a way to better our knowledge and understanding of early modern merchants and their relationship with colonial economies and empires.
Although the tstd has provided us with an impressive collection of data on slave voyages, including details on ship owners and captains, little is known about private merchants' participation in the transatlantic slave trade. The studies of Vila Vilar, Franco Vega, Miller, Newson and Michin, and Green, among others, focusing mainly on Portuguese private engagement in this commerce are some of the few exceptions.4
Most of these studies have, however, concentrated their attention on the activities of groups of private merchants who operated solely or mainly with 3 Calculations made by the author on the basis of the information available on http://www .slavevoyages.org, 20-06-2012. 4 Enriqueta Vila Vilar, "La sublevacíon de Portugal y la trata de negros". members of their own group, whether this group was ethnic-, religious-, or kinbased. This scenario contrasts with other Atlantic areas and commercial branches for which private merchants' activities and cross-cultural businesses networks have been examined and well-documented in various recent studies.5 Schnurmann, Studnicki-Gizbert, Ebert, Trivellato, and Antunes are some of the most important contributions.6 These authors have not only clearly shown the role played by private businessmen in the making of the early modern Atlantic economy, but have also devoted more attention to the study of the involvement of merchants in financial and commercial ventures with partners outside of their traditional business connections, including family, friends and the firms -also known as the F-connection.7 In other words, individuals that engaged in transactions with members of other cultural groups are regarded as cross-cultural. Here, it is also our goal to study the business relationships established between merchants of different ethnic, religious and cultural affiliations8 for the operation of the slave trade, leading to the formation of cross-cultural business networks extending across the borders of various European empires.9 During the early modern period, Portuguese, Sephardic Jews, Dutch, Flemish and German businessmen based in the Dutch Republic, Portugal and other places in Europe, as well as in Spanish America, Brazil, Angola and Mozambique were at the heart of this complex system of interactions.10 They will be the prime focus of this study. Here, we will look into their activities during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
By analysing two chronological periods and connections between multiple geographical areas we aim to explore how the establishment of these networks might have aided private initiative to defy and or cooperate with monopolies imposed by states or state-sponsored companies.
Our analysis is based on a selection of case studies made accordingly to the quality and number of relevant primary sources gathered in Portuguese and Dutch archives.11 The study of these primary materials is complemented with information available in the tstd and secondary literature. Let us start, however, by briefly examining the juridical framework that regulated the participation of private merchants in the transatlantic slave trade.
Legal Frameworks for Private Participation in the Transatlantic Slave Trade: The Iberian and Dutch Cases
During the early modern period the juridical framework regulating private participation in the transatlantic slave trade within the sphere of influence of the Iberian Crowns and the Dutch Republic underwent several changes. Those changes affected the business prospects for private merchants and the level of risk involved in financial and commercial transactions associated with the slave trade, both directly and indirectly, leading to possible changes in terms of networks' formation and operation. Portuguese trade with western Africa had been a monopoly since the midfifteenth century. To organize trade and prevent the intervention of smugglers, the Crown had established monopolies and several factories in the Guinea-Bissau region, Cape Verde, and São Tomé. However, by the late fifteenth century, the Crown started to grant private merchants trading licenses to operate within certain areas and with a specific range of goods as well as to lease direct management of the different monopolies to private interests. Between the 1530s and 1640s, the latter became common practice. The monopolies of the Cape Verdean and Guinean, São Tomé, and Angolan trades were leased regularly to private businessmen, named as contratadores.12 The contratadores had permission to trade and to place their own factors and assistants in the different regions. They were also allowed to grant avenças (trading licenses) to other private merchants. The avenças were contracts authorizing the avençador (license holder) to export a certain quantity of a given product within a specific geographical area. According to these contracts, the contratadores would cover the risks involved in the transport, such as shipwreck, fire, and capture by pirates and corsairs. The other party had permission to load the quantity of goods mentioned in the contract in a specific port. The contratador or his agents could sell these trading licenses, in either Portugal or the Atlantic possessions. To avoid losses, they could demand a fiança (pledge of goods) from the avençadores.
In addition, during the fifteenth century, in an attempt to promote settlement and economic development, the Crown also made several royal donations of overseas lands to noblemen (the so-called donatários and capitães-donatários), which included administrative and judicial powers, as well as commercial freedoms. As a consequence, the donatários, capitães-donatários and the settlers of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Angola held royal permission to trade with the nearest regions of the African continent, opening the door for another stream of private participation in the slave trade, as well as in other businesses.13
On the other hand, throughout the Union of the Iberian Crowns (1580-1640), the Portuguese commercial and financial community were also able to hold contracts from the Spanish royal monopolies.14 The Spanish asiento -Spain's monopoly over the trading licenses for the regular supply of African slaves to the Spanish American colonies -was among those contracts. Between 1586 and 1640, Portuguese businessmen monopolized the system of asientos. By simultaneously holding the Spanish asiento and the Portuguese royal monopolies on the African trade, these merchants managed to control both the major supply and the consumer markets for slave labour. After the Portuguese Restoration in 1640, the Portuguese merchants who held the asiento at the time abandoned Seville, and the links of the Portuguese mercantile elite based in Lisbon to the transatlantic slave trade appeared to weaken.15 Between the 1640s and 1670s, most contratadores of the Angolan royal monopoly were citizens and merchants based in Luanda.16 Whereas in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the role played, in part, by the contratadores was taken over by several commercial companies chartered by the crown and given monopoly rights over the trade with Brazil and various regions of western Africa.17 The establishment of these companies did not, however, remove private merchants from the slave and other colonial trades.
Thus, from the early sixteenth century, private merchants controlled the Crown monopolies in western Africa, including the slave trade. These regulations opened a window for the legal participation in the colonial trade for them, but simultaneously created enough room for private initiatives that also challenged the monopolies, either through tax evasion, smuggling, and other types of transactions deemed as 'illegal' by the states and companies.
In the Dutch Republic, trade with western Africa, including the slave trade, was controlled by private businessmen until 1621. In the main Dutch port cities, there were a handful of private firms and several independent businessmen involved in these commercial branches.18 These private firms had no formal commercial organization comparable to the wic, and only hired merchants and accountants aboard ships, onshore, or aboard floating trading posts.19 The establishment of the wic by the States-General in 1621 brought to an end this initial period of free trade, by granting the wic a monopoly over all Atlantic commerce.20 From its outset, the chartering of the wic was met with great opposition from the merchants of Amsterdam and the northern port cities of the Republic, who had important investments in the north Atlantic fisheries, Brazilian sugar and dyewood, the salt trade with South America, and the African gold, ivory, and slave trades. Some commercial branches were, therefore, detached from the wic monopoly soon after its establishment. The Brazilian and African trades, however, remained under the wic's control, but not without hampering profits for both the wic and the private merchants.
Between the mid-1630s and 1650s, the military character of the wic caused the disruption of many activities in Brazil and western Africa, while, in the Republic, the burden of paying for the huge military campaigns against the Portuguese possessions in the Atlantic began to be felt.21 As early as the mid-1630s, the wic lacked the cash flow to operate its businesses in Brazil, western Africa, the Caribbean, and North America and struggled to ensure the transport of commodities, personnel, and weaponry between its posts and settlements. To mitigate its losses, the wic gave shareholders permission to participate in the trade with Brazil and the Caribbean in 1638. In 1647, the wic also agreed to open the slave trade from Angola to Brazil, the Caribbean, and the Spanish Americas to private merchants. Finally, in 1648, the trade with North America, including the slave trade, was opened to private merchants from the Republic. This shift in the wic policies opened a wide range of opportunities for businesses in the Republic, and it meant that, for substantial periods of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, private merchants controlled most of the Atlantic commerce, including the slave trade.
Pieter van den Broeke, Pieter van den Broecke's journal of voyages to Cape Verde, Guinea and Angola (1605) (1606) (1607) (1608) (1609) (1610) (1611) (1612) The only branch of Atlantic trade that remained as a wic monopoly was the trade in gold.22
The bankruptcy of the first wic in 1674 and the process leading to the chartering of a second company under the same name, did not introduce major changes to the legal framework already in place. Although, the second wic held a nominal monopoly over Dutch participation in the slave trade, including activities in Loango and Angola, and had administrative, fiscal and military authority to enforce this monopoly,23 more often than not the transatlantic slave trade remained in the hands of private entrepreneurs and merchants in the Republic and their partners elsewhere. In time, the wic became primarily an administrative, fiscal and military organization, responsible for the maintenance and administration of outposts in western Africa as well as taxation on trade, while private firms appeared to dominate the trade itself. This was reflected in the increasing activities of interlopers in the Company monopoly.24 It continued with the formation of multiple small, medium and large-sized companies in Dutch ports and their increasing role in the commerce between the Republic, western Africa, and particularly the Loango and Angolan regions. The mcc, founded in 1720, is the best known example of such private independent consortia.25 22 Emmer, "The West India Company": 79- Although states and state-sponsored companies regulated the participation of private merchants in their commercial monopolies, they struggled to enforce this legislation. This fact opened up broad opportunities for individuals to engage in commercial activities that fell out of the aforementioned legal framework, creating business portfolios and networks that simultaneously combined legal and "illegal" transactions, and explored the voids in the regulations to their own advantage. In this process, royal officers and companies' employees on-the-spot also played an important role.
In the following two sections of this study we will examine in detail four case studies in an attempt to emphasize the advantages (and/or disadvantages) of these business networks as mechanisms to challenge, defy and/or cooperate with the monopolies of the Iberian Crowns and the Dutch statesponsored companies, among others.
Slave Trade Monopolies and Private Networks in the Seventeenth Century: The Iberian and the wic Monopolies and the Sephardi and Christian Networks
Between ca. 1590 and 1623, the Republic was home to two groups of merchants with economic interests in the slave trade: a group of Christian merchants of Dutch, Flemish, and German origin (hereafter referred to as Dutch) and the Portuguese Sephardim established in Amsterdam and other Dutch cities.
The Dutch merchants started their economic activities in the south Atlantic in the late 1580s, mainly investing in the Brazilian sugar and dyewood trades and the African commerce in gold, ivory and leather.26 In these early years, Dutch participation in the slave trade was minimal, as the studies by Postma or lack of commodities and enslaved Africans in the ports of embarkation and issues related to disembarkation, the sale of commodities and the purchase of return cargos. In this business, Manuel de Carvalho, also Portuguese and based in Amsterdam, acted as credit provider. For instance, in 1617, Carvalho had granted commercial credit to Belmonte for the venture of the St. Michiel. The ship had been freighted by Belmonte and skippered by Sebastião Ribeiro to transport slaves from Angola to the Spanish West Indies. Here, Francisco Ribeiro was Belmonte's contact person. In 1617, Francisco sent to Seville a return cargo on board to De Capitaine Francisco Ferreira.32 In the slave voyages organized by the Belmonte family and its associates, the cargos on board the ships were insured by Anthoine van Dimen, Albert Schuijt, Wijbrant Warwijck, Hans van Soldt de Jonge, Pelgrom van Dronckelaer, and Samuel Voerknecht, among many others. For example, in 1614, they insured for Diogo Nunes Belmonte the slaves transported on board the ship De Engel Michiel, as well as the return cargo of gold, silver, and other commodities. Captain Sebastião Ribeiro was hired to sail the Luanda-West Indies-Seville route.33
Hence, the commercial interests of the Portuguese Sephardic Jews of Amsterdam and their agents crossed the geographical boundaries of several Atlantic empires, encompassing not only the Iberian Atlantic, but also areas like Jamaica and Martinique, which were under the increasing influence of the English and French. Their networks had a trans-imperial character not only from a commercial view point, but also in the financial organization of the ventures and their insurance.
As importantly, Belmonte's network and the roles played by his partners and their activities within the business web clearly show how it was possible for private merchants and entrepreneurs to operate successfully within the legal frames imposed by monopolistic states, like the Iberian Crowns. Simultaneously, this example demonstrates how it was possible for foreign investors such as the German, Flemish and Dutch, who were legally not authorized to participate directly in the Iberian slave trade and other colonial trades, to engage in these commercial branches indirectly by covering the risks of the voyages organized by this network, and, in this way, defying the rules of operation of the Iberian monopolies. In addition, the Belmonte case also calls our attention to the advantages that cross-cultural networks offer their members in terms of strategies to draw capital from different sources, and to benefit from combining 32 saa, na, 146/199v-200v: 23 February 1617. 33
Ibidem.
know-how about European and colonial supply and consumption markets, and about the modus operandi through the bureaucratic apparatus of Iberian monopolies and their surveilling institutions, namely the Casa da Índia in Lisbon and the Casa de la Contratación, in Seville.
Combining both legally-bounded and defiant business activities was not only a reality within the Iberian monopolies on the slave trade and colonial commerce, but was also a common practice within the state-sponsored monopolistic companies, such as the Dutch wic. From a legal point of view, the establishment of the wic by the States-General in 1621 required private merchants in the Republic to abandon their participation in the Atlantic commerce. By 1623, these regulations were enforced and the latter had to bring their activities to a halt. Many protested, and others devised strategies to continue operations in these areas. These included the use of passports from non-Dutch cities, ports of departure outside of the Republic, and instructions to supercargoes to trade in areas out of the reach of the jurisdiction of the wic, due to the threat of confiscation of the vessel and cargo by the wic.34 Both the Portuguese Sephardim and the Dutch made use of these strategies. 35 However, as was mentioned earlier, the strict monopoly of the wic did not last long due to the financial and commercial difficulties faced by the company. From the mid-1630s, individuals were authorized to participate in the monopoly trade and as early as the mid-1640s an increasing number of Dutch merchants chose to cooperate with the wic and comply with her trade regulations as a strategy to improve their business opportunities. Henrico Mathias, a merchant of German descent based in Amsterdam in the second half of the seventeenth century, is a case in point.
On August 1, 1657, Henrico Mathias signed a contract with the directors of the wic to deliver slaves to Curaçao on the ship De Coninck Salomon.36 Like Mathias, Heerman Abrahamsen, and their associates, as well as Balthasar and Joseph Coymans -all merchants in Amsterdam -also signed agreements with the wic for the supply of slaves to the Dutch Caribbean and the Spanish Americas, in 1662 and 1675, respectively.37
At the same time, and in an identical way as the Belmonte case analysed earlier, they too associated themselves with business partners outside their natural group in a clear attempt to capitalize on the know-how these outsiders had of business in European, African and American markets, and their knowledge of the legislation and legal procedure in use in each commercial branch and region under the control of the different monopolistic entities. Mathias' activities have left us with a paper trail that allows us to reconstruct, at least in part, his cross-cultural and trans-imperial slave trade networks. He started his economic activities in the Atlantic in the 1650s and remained active until the 1670s, showing clear interests in western Africa, Brazil, the Caribbean Islands, New Netherland, and the Spanish American colonies in both South and Central America and the West Indies.
In order to organize the slave trade, Mathias had connections in Europe, western Africa and the American colonies. In Europe, Henrico Mathias appeared associated with Jacinto Vasques, a merchant in Seville with investments in the slave trade, as well as with Marcelo van der Goes and Philip van Hulten, merchants in Amsterdam.38 Whereas in London, Jacob Luce (possibly Jacob de Luz? of Portuguese Sephardic origin) had power of attorney and commercial credit from Mathias to recover goods seized by English privateers.39
In western Africa, Mathias' main activity was the slave trade, though he also participated in other trades. His representatives were present in Angola and on the Gold Coast, more precisely in Mina, Mouri, Cape Coast, Accra and Kormantin.40 Here, Henrico kept up regular contacts with the representatives of the wic.41
In the trade with the Spanish Central American colonies, including the slave trade, Mathias was associated with Johan van Wickevoort and Jacomo Ruland or Rulant, the first based in Amsterdam and also involved in the Russian trade,42 and the latter in Antwerp.43 Don Manuel d' Acosta y Souza and Captain Benito d' Almeda, most likely Spaniards, also appeared involved in the slave trade activities of Mathias between Cape Verde area and the Spanish colonies.44
In the inter-and intra-continental trade with the Caribbean and, more precisely, Curaçao, Henrico appears associated with Guillelmo Belin le Garde and Thus, Mathias operated several inter-continental routes connecting Europe, western Africa and the Americas, with the transatlantic slave trade as one of his important areas of investment. In this business, he appeared associated with several directors of the Amsterdam Chamber of the wic and relied on an extensive network of people including skippers, ship captains, pilots, insurers, credit providers, and supercargoes of different ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. Together they acquired essential pieces of information to deal with the monopolistic regulations of the wic, either to cooperate with the company and/or to circumvent its procedures and to handle the supplydemand patterns of the coastal markets of supply and consumption on both shores of the Atlantic. Some of Mathias' contacts also had good connections with the Spanish authorities in the Caribbean islands, the Spanish American mainland and Spain.
In this process the officials of the wic on-the-spot, including directors, chief-merchants, and financial officers, among others, played an important role as they could control and supervise commercial transactions and label them as "legal" or "illegal" according the wic rules. But as importantly, they could engage privately in trade with merchants not authorized to trade within the wic monopoly areas and commercial branches, or by facilitating tax evasion, bribery, etc. although all these practices would be labelled "corruption" by the wic directors in the Republic. These were, however, common practices among company officials elsewhere, including the voc servants in Asia,54 or the employees of the English and French African companies serving in the Gold Coast in the eighteenth century, as we will see in more detail in the following section.
Slave Trade Monopolies and Private Networks in the Eighteenth Century: Monopoly Holders and the Portuguese-Brazilian Merchant Networks
In the eighteenth century, alongside various commercial companies and firms, either state-sponsored or built entirely on private initiative (like the mcc), merchants based in Europe and elsewhere in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans kept organizing their commercial activities and networks with eyes fixed not only on the opportunities offered within the empire of their 'home' state or kingdom, but also on locations outside the jurisdiction of their home states. 54 Chris Nierstrasz, In the Shadow of the Company: The voc (Dutch East India Company) and its Servants in the Period of its Decline,1740-1796. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
Like in earlier periods, their selection of business partners often fell out of their traditional groups -the family, the friends and the firm -to incorporate merchants of other ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds, based in Europe as well as in different colonial spaces and sometimes even with formal links to other monopolistic entities, either in the capacity of state officials or company employees. These practises become quite evident from an analysis of the Portuguese-Brazilian networks that operated in the Brazil-Gulf of Guinea slave trade circuits during the eighteenth century. During this period, due to a continuous growth in the demand for slave labour in the Americas, the transatlantic slave trade witnessed a significant increase in terms of the number of voyages, vessels, total number of enslaved Africans transported, and regions of embarkation and disembarkation. In Brazil, the location of mining fields in the interior was one of the major factors contributing to this increase. To cater to these new labour needs of the Brazilian market, while avoiding the strong competition of Portuguese slave merchants already involved in the trade with Angola, and the still stronger presence of Dutch, and foremost the English and French in the Gold Coast, new slave circuits linking Brazil to the Bight of Benin and the Slave Coast (the so-called Costa da Mina55) emerged after the 1670s. The commercial operations in these routes, which remained active for most of the eighteenth century, offer us an excellent insight into the main topic under scrutiny here.
For most of the first half of the eighteenth century Portuguese-Brazilian56 merchants based in the regions of Pernambuco, Bahia, and Rio de Janeiro57 resorted to cross-cultural and trans-imperial commercial circuits and financial 55 In Although the Bight of Benin and the so-called "Slave Coast" were never formally under the control of Portugal, throughout the entire early modern period the Portuguese Crown always felt empowered enough to issue various laws regulating the commerce of its subjects and foreigners in these regions. As mentioned earlier, for most of the fifteenth and sixteenth century settlers of São Tomé had been permitted to trade with the so-called Costa da Mina as means to acquire the necessary labour force for the deforestation of the island and the construction of sugar mills and the subsequent production of sugar. In the course of the sixteenth century, Portuguese and foreign merchants in possession of trading licences and/or those holding leases for the Crown's monopoly on the trade with the island of São Tomé, were also granted permission to trade on the region.
The takeover of the Portuguese forts on the Gold Coast, and the temporary occupation of the islands of the Gulf of Guinea by the Dutch wic, all within the context of the Eighty Years War, would lead the Habsburg monarchs to forbid Portuguese subjects from trading in the region. However, the economic decline of the Gulf Guinea Archipelago in the 1650s and 1660s and the difficulties faced by the Portuguese Atlantic economy as a whole led the Portuguese monarchs to lift these trading bans with the Costa da Mina. On 11 March 1673, the Portuguese Crown granted all its subjects ("from this kingdom and the Conquests") permission to trade with the aforementioned Coast. There were, however, a few requirements. Vessels, regardless of their port of registration, had to depart from Portugal. They also had to call at São Tomé on the way to the Coast to pay the duties owed to the Portuguese Crown, with payment being calculated on the basis of the estimated value of the cargo to be acquired on the Coast.60 58 Verger, Fluxo e refluxo do tráfico de escravos: 21. 59
Carreira, As companhias pombalinas de navegação. 60 Lopes, Negócio da Costa da Mina: 33-38. Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, Seção de Manuscritos, 11, 3, 1; "Provisão do Conselho Ultramarino. Lisboa, 16 de Março de 1673".
Finally, transactions were limited to commerce with African traders and not with other European merchants or officials of chartered companies. Over time, several ports in Brazil were also authorised to trade directly with the Costa da Mina, namely Salvador (Bahia), Rio de Janeiro, and Recife, Goiana and Paraíba (Pernambuco).61 This permission also had its caveats. Besides, the last two requirements mentioned above, Portuguese-Brazilian merchants operating in these direct circuits were forbidden to use high quality Brazilian gold and tobacco in these transactions (only low grade tobacco was allowed). European goods used as exchange commodities in the transactions had to be brought from Brazil. Finally, merchants operating in this business were obliged to pay royal duties on the value of the cargoes transported at the ports of embarkation and disembarkation.
It was within this context that The community included merchants based in the major Brazilian ports of the time, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador (Bahia), and Recife (Pernambuco). As briefly mentioned earlier, many of the merchants were of Portuguese origin, but for various reasons based their businesses in Brazil. For further details on these merchants see, for example: Alexandre Vieira Ribeiro, "O comércio das almas e a obtenção de prestígio social: traficantes de escravos na Bahia ao longo do século xviii". Many of these partnerships were established as means to gather enough financial and material resources to organize the slave ventures, but in many cases they were also a way to capitalise on the business experience and knowledge of peers involved in this commerce for a longer period of time. This was, for example, the case of Manoel Correa Seixas, Viana's main associate between 1714 and 1726. In 1707, when Viana came into the business, Seixas had already single-handedly organized at least four slave voyages between Bahia and the Costa da Mina since 1700, the year he entered the business. Until 1714, the year Seixas stopped organizing slave voyages single-handedly, he alone had carried out more than six voyages and several others in partnership.
Although, Viana's associates and the ship captains serving in his vessels were all Portuguese-Brazilian merchants, and the ports of departure and disembarkation visited by his ships were part of the Portuguese Empire, most of the slave purchases in West Africa were carried out in ports outside the sphere 66 European merchants and chartered companies based in the region were eager to access these commodities. In the case of the wic, Postma estimates that between 1715 and 1731, the Company sold an annual average to 200 slaves to Portuguese-Brazilian slavers.67 Payments were often made in gold, as the shipments of this mineral by the Company during this period clearly show. 68 On the other hand, Brazilian tobacco, also called Portuguese tobacco, was reported by officials of the Royal African Company of England (rac) to be one of the main products traded by the Dutch in certain ports.69 These were not, agents established there. 75 The same assumption is also valid for trade conducted by Portuguese-Brazilians at the port of Jacquin, as was the case of Viana and Seixas mentioned earlier. Although the Portuguese Crown had an establishment in this port,76 the Dutch built first a trading house, and latter a fort (Fort Zelandia, 1726-1734)77 there, where they traded regularly with Portuguese-Brazilian merchants. An official report from the Portuguese Overseas Council dating from 2 November 1721 stated that in Jacquin the wic officials sold: 'slaves and merchandise to ships of Bahia in the value of more than one million cruzados every year [paid] in gold powder' . 78 In fact, already in 1707, the Director of the rac urged the factors at Cape Coast Castle and Whydah to trade with the Portuguese-Brazilians, especially in gold, merchandise (possibly tobacco, which was a commodity in great demand among the Europeans) and slaves, with the sole condition that the Company factors could not sell European commodities. 79 Lúis Coelho Ferreira, a prominent merchant in Bahia, is another case in point. Between 1749 and 1784, Ferreira, either alone or in partnership with David de Oliveira Lopes, Manuel Lourenço da Costa, among others, participated regularly in the slave trade with Western Africa.80 Although Ferreira's direct partners in this business had the same cultural background and religious affiliations, some of them engaged in the slave trade in areas controlled by the British, including Barbados. Given this fact and the clear English interest and investment in the Brazilian colonial economy during the same period, it is very likely that English capital also found its way into the organization of these Portuguese-Brazilian slave voyages, as was the case in the aforementioned trade of Torres.
In addition, Ferreira and his partners acquired their slave cargoes mainly on the Gold Coast and Bight of Benin -sixty-five percent of the total number of voyages organized. Most likely these human cargoes were purchased from European and African merchants on the Coast, since these areas remained during the second half of the eighteenth century outside of the effective control of the Portuguese Crown. It is also likely that European merchants in these areas, either operating in their own name or on behalf of a specific Statesponsored company, offered better deals. Moreover, the high concentration of trading posts and forts along the Coast under the control of rival European monopolistic companies also increased the possibilities for bargaining on the part of Portuguese-Brazilian merchants as well as their chances for making the best deal.
The remaining thirty-five percent of the slave vessels equipped by Ferreira and partners headed to Benguela, Cabinda and São Tomé. Although these were areas under the formal sovereignty of the Portuguese Crown, they were also removed from the main administrative and fiscal centre of the slave trade at the time which was located in Luanda. The choice of these locations for the acquisition of slaves, in particular Benguela and Cabinda, appears to have been part of a clear strategy on the part of these merchant networks to avoid the constraints imposed by the Portuguese Crown on slave vessels operating in the Angolan trade. All vessels were required to sail via Luanda to allow Portuguese royal officials to inspect and tax cargoes, and, in some cases, to also earn some extra income through bribes.81 The dislocation of slave routes and slave trade networks from areas under the effective control of the States and Statesponsored companies continued to be a strategy adopted by private merchants 81 This shift of slave merchants to ports of purchase away from the control of states would be once again visible in the first half of the nineteenth century, involved in the slave trade well into the eighteenth century. Even commercial firms like the mcc chose areas for the purchase of slaves in Western Africa out of the reach of the jurisdiction and effective control of State and Statesponsored monopolies -in this specific case by concentrating its activities in the Loango and Congo regions. Thus, from a geographical and commercial point of view, the operations of the Portuguese-Brazilian mercantile communities engaged in the slave trade between Brazil, the Gold Coast, the Costa da Mina or the peripheral regions of Angola, had a trans-imperial character. These businessmen acquired their slave 'cargoes' in areas outside or on the margins of the Portuguese empire and the jurisdiction of the Portuguese Crown, as a way to circumvent the constraints imposed by royal regulations on this commerce. Simultaneously, the enslaved Africans were not only obtained from African merchants and trade representatives of African authorities but also from other European traders settled or operating on the Coast, in most cases Dutch and English.82 More importantly, these merchants relied on these Northern European connections to obtain European, Asian and African commodities, especially textiles, alcoholic beverages and weapons (mainly guns), which were either difficult to purchase in Brazil for a good price, or were listed among the merchandise that was forbidden to be traded in Western Africa by Portuguese subjects.
From a logistical point of view, the networks built by many of these merchants, however, do not appear to be trans-imperial like those described for 82 At this level, parallels can also be established with the commercial activities of other European merchants of the time, like for example the French traders of Nantes, Bordeaux, and Le Havre. In most of their slaving operations in the Atlantic, as well as in the Indian Ocean, their ports of slave purchase were often outside the jurisdiction of the French Empire. In the Atlantic, they included the regions of the the former century. This was the case for the eighteenth-century Portuguese-Brazilian businessmen, mentioned earlier. The vessels employed by the Portuguese-Brazilians in the slave trade between Brazil, the Gold Coast, and Costa da Mina, as well as some of the vessels used in the bilateral commerce between Angola and Brazil, were built in Brazilian shipyards and equipped in the local ports. 83 In most cases, the ship captain acted as a representative of the interests of both the ship owner and other investors. These ships, like the remaining crew, appear to have been manned by Portuguese-and Afro-Brazilian crews recruited locally; some of them were enslaved Africans and were the property of the ship owners themselves.84 In this respect, these eighteenth-century Portuguese-Brazilian networks and their modus operandi might be regarded as an exception within the broader context of the transatlantic slave trade, since none of the major slavery-based colonial economies in the English, French, and Dutch Atlantic empires engaged in the direct slave trade with Western Africa or were even authorized by their European colonial masters to build or equip ships for intercontinental trade. 85 To finance part of the slave ventures some of these merchants did get credit from local sources at least 30 percent interest. Capital required for the voyages could also be obtained by the ship owner by freighting space on the hold of the vessels to individuals, who often invested a small amount of money in commodities to receive, in exchange, one or two slaves from the Costa da Mina. In some cases, however, credit and insurance also appear to have been provided by business partners based in Europe, namely in Portugal and England. This evidence suggests that during the eighteenth century there might have been investment of foreign capital into the Portuguese slave trade as had been the case in the seventeenth century. Further research, however, is needed to assess the levels of investment of financers from other nations in the Portuguese-Brazilian slave trade.
Final Remarks
The complex connections described above demonstrates clearly that the commercial interests of private merchants involved in the slave trade living in Europe and various colonial areas transcended the political and geographical borders of the various early modern European empires. In addition, it shows that, in many cases, the selection of business partners fell outside of their natural group, i.e. the family, friends and the firms. Portuguese, Brazilian, Sephardic and Dutch merchants operating from the Republic, Portugal, and other Atlantic areas commonly established commercial webs encompassing several Atlantic Empires -Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, and even English. To operate their slave trade networks, they chose associates not according to kin, ethnic, religious or cultural background, but rather business interests. Choosing partners outside of the natural groups appears to have been a way not only to reduce risks associated with trafficking, but also to draw capital from different sources into the business, to amalgamate know-how about European and colonial supply and consumption markets, and about the modus operandi through the bureaucratic apparatus of monopolies and their surveilling institutions, either to cooperate and/or circumvent constraints imposed on commercial and financial transactions.86 Many of these webs operated their businesses in areas under the control of the monopolies of various European States and/or State-sponsored companies. Individuals connected through these networks carried out transactions between merchants and commercial agents or representatives of different States, commercial companies and 'nations' .
In the eyes of monopoly holders in Lisbon, the Dutch Republic and England, the activities of private merchants and the transactions carried out between them and the officials of the companies in various regions of Western Africa had simultaneously a legal and illegal dimension. The data analysed here is very telling for how private merchant activities and their networks could find ways to circumvent the regulations established by the holders of monopolies on the slave trade, whether they were States or State-sponsored companies. The information discussed here also clearly highlights how the official representatives of the monopoly holders on-the-spot, such as royal or Company officials, not only surveilled the activities of private merchants, but also engaged 86 Cooperation with partners outside of the natural groups as means to reduce risk was not only a strategy employed in the slave trade, but also in other commercial activities developed in the early modern Atlantic world. in exchanges deemed legal by the monopoly holders. They also found ways to defy the regulations issued by the monopoly holders in Europe, involving themselves in transactions regarded as 'illegal,' either in their own name, or on behalf of the Company. The latter would often be carried out under the argument that these types of transactions would be beneficial for the monopoly in obtaining a better position than other rival monopolies in the local, regional and international markets.
